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Tracking pupils may reduce social segregation in residential
neighborhoods and schools
Perhaps the most common critique of tracking in schools is that it reinforces pre-existing
inequalities by segregating pupils from privileged backgrounds away from the rest of the student
body. However, in their new research Gianni De Fraja and Francisco Martinez-Mora find
evidence that tracking may actually reduce neighborhood segregation, as it provides parents with
an incentive to keep their children in schools in disadvantaged areas if it means their children will
be placed into a top track.
Our recent theoretical research uncovers a hitherto unnoticed subtle effect of tracking—the
practice of forming classes according to pupils’ ability—in schools. We show that tracking (known
as streaming or setting in the UK) may weaken socioeconomic residential and school
segregation, that is, it may lessen the tendency of households to choose neighbors of similar
income and socioeconomic status and thus promote more socially mixed schools. Given that
children share leisure and school time, play, join the local sports team, attend local community
events, and later date with their neighbors and school mates, mixing children of different social
backgrounds helps those from disadvantaged social backgrounds integrate into society, exposes
them to different lifestyles, role models and aspirations, with potentially long term benefits.
Allocation by ability is as controversial a practice as it is widespread, and it generates strong emotions among
teachers and parents, as well as heated academic and policy debates. Advocates of tracking emphasize that
sorting pupils by ability makes it easier for the whole class to be engaged by appropriately tailored and paced
lessons. Conversely, teaching pupils of differing abilities together risks losing some of them and boring others.
Those who might find lessons too hard may become disruptive, while moving too slow wastes precious learning
time for others.
Opponents, such as the
“detracking American schools”
movement, hold that tracking
harms the weakest children,
often the most vulnerable or
those from disadvantaged
backgrounds, by perpetuating
stigmas, ghettos, and hierarchical
stereotypes and thus hampers
social mobility and equality of
opportunities. Given the well
documented correlation between
school “readiness” and family
socioeconomic background,
children from disadvantaged
backgrounds will necessarily be
overrepresented in low ability
classes, and, as a result, receive
lower quality education and will
have a smaller chance to enter
higher education, among other  consequences.
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The objection that tracking lowers the quality of the education received by disadvantaged pupils is clearly valid
given a school’s student population. However, the school’s population is not given, but it is determined by the
residential composition of the neighborhood, which is the product of the complex interaction between residential
choices, the housing market and the education policy itself. Our research explains that, because of this complex
feedback loop, when schools track students, households may choose to live in less segregated neighborhoods.
While we determined that tracking may reduce segregation through rigorous mathematical modelling, its intuition
is natural enough: parents care about the quality of the education their children receive and they are willing to pay
for it, but better off parents are more willing to pay for it, if only because they have more disposable income. Public
schools are, of course, free of charge, but to the extent that the ability to choose a school depends on residential
choices, for example, because schools have a “catchment area” or other residence based selection criteria, well-
off parents are more willing to pay for houses that guarantee a place at a high-achieving school. This prices
households of lower socioeconomic background out of good school neighborhoods, ensuring that more children
from good socioeconomic background, who are more likely to be “ready for school,” attend the good neighborhood
school, and further enhances the desirability of—and hence a well-off household’s willingness to pay for—houses
in those areas. We show that this feedback loop stops only when there is complete stratification by income:
children from better off households all live in the same neighborhood and all attend the same school, while
children from less well-off households all live in a different neighborhood and all attend the school of that
neighborhood.
This is not so when schools track
pupils. To see why, consider the
simple case where each school
has two tracks: the more able
students in the top track, the rest
in the lower track. Parents from a
high socioeconomic background,
who are not constrained in their
choice of school by their ability to
pay for housing, need to choose
where to live. When they do so,
they take into account the quality
of the peer group their children
will interact with at each school
and the positive correlation
between ability and
socioeconomic background. If
one neighborhood has
households of a better social
background than another, then
high ability children will be in the top track in either school, and so their parents will choose the school in the better
neighborhood.
Similarly, well-off parents whose children are less academic and will be in the lower track in either school will
again choose the better neighborhood. But parents of children of middling ability face a true dilemma: they have to
choose between living in a better district, with many other households of good socioeconomic background, where
their child is likely to be placed in the low track (because a large proportion of children in that school are more able
than him or her), and living in a district with fewer households of high socioeconomic background, but a higher
chance that their child is in the top track at school, and thus benefits from a higher ability peer group. Some of
these parents might prefer the higher track for their child, even if it means having neighbors of a lower
socioeconomic background. If a few choose so, the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood “improves”,
encouraging more parents from good social background to move in, further improving the neighborhood and
creating a virtuous cycle of socioeconomic desegregation. The end result is neighborhoods and schools with
socioeconomic mixing.
Lest such strategic behavior be considered beyond the capability of ordinary parents, recall the Texas’ “ top-ten
percent” policy: this guarantees a place in a state university to pupils in the top ten percent of their school, and
Texan parents have responded to it modifying their choice of school in order to send their children to schools with
fewer gifted pupils, where they were therefore more likely to be in the coveted top-ten percent. Other empirical
evidence suggests that social mobility may actually be larger with tracking than without, and uncovers relatively
low levels of residential segregation in US cities; this could well be due to the mechanism examined in our
theoretical research.
This article is based on the paper “The Desegregating Effect of School Tracking ,” which appeared in the Journal
of Urban Economics.
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